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ABSTRACT: The concept of deliberative privilege poses a true threat to maintaining public involvement in public 
policy decision-making. The threat arises from the very nature of privileges themselves. They sacrifice individual 
interests in the interest of a larger public good. Unfortunately, deliberative privilege sacrifices such interests as 
ensuring justice for the individual and public participation. However, a way exists to overcome the threats the 
privilege establishes – characterize criteria as facts and thus discoverable and open to public scrutiny. Just 
knowing the criteria upon which public administrators base their decisions could give the public confidence in 
those administrators and their policies. 
KEYWORDS: administrative decision-making, criteria, deliberative privilege, Freedom of Information Act, 
LUST, public participation, Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEQ), LUST 
1. INTRODUCTION 
By the 1980’s, over half of the million petroleum underground storage tanks in the United 
States were leaking and thus potentially contaminating groundwater, soil and air. 
Consequently, in 1986 Congress created the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust 
Fund, and in September of 1988 the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
issued underground storage tank regulations. Those regulations required owners of 
underground storage tanks to locate, remove, upgrade or replace all their underground tanks. 
Further, it gave each state the authority to establish a program to compensate those owners. In 
Tennessee that program is run by the State of Tennessee’s Division of Underground Storage 
Tanks, a division of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. Under that 
program, rather than being conducted by the State itself, independent contractors do the actual 
remediation work and then the State reimburses them according to its reimbursement 
guidelines. Southern Environmental Management & Specialties (SEMS) is one of those 
contractors for the State of Tennessee.  
2. BACKGROUND 
In the winter of 2014, SEMS implemented a corrective action plan that included the 
installation of a Corrective Action System (CAS) at a former Amoco gasoline station now 
owned by Ali Aman. On March 31, 2014, SEMS, on behalf of the owner Aman, submitted a 
reimbursement application to the State of Tennessee’s Division of Underground Storage Tanks 
requesting payment for corrective action costs incurred between January 1, 2014 and February 
28, 2014. On April 22, 2014, while it approved almost all requests, still the Division denied 
$8,992.00. On May 19, 2014, SEMS appealed the denial. In its letter dated May 23, 2014, the 
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Division approved payment for $4,761.00 of the appealed amount, but still denied the 
remaining $4,231.00.  
 SEMS made several arguments in its May 19, 2014 appeal letter for why the disallowed 
costs should be reimbursed. While the State agreed with one of them, hence the approval of the 
$4,761.00, it did not accept the others. Therefore, it continued to deny the $4,231 submitted for 
the rental of storage drums for construction debris on which no laboratory analysis had been 
performed to determine if it were contaminated and the cost for the removal of those drums.  
 In its appeal letter, SEMS argued even if no analysis had been performed, the rental of 
additional containers for the storage of “construction debris” that included non-contaminated 
soil generated from trenching for piping and drilling recovery wells should be covered as well 
as the removal of that “debris” from the site. SEMS stated this was the first time it was aware 
of construction debris disposal being denied reimbursement. Further, the Company noted it had 
only recently been informed that excavated pipe trenching material or non-contaminated drill 
cuttings “should be used as backfill or spread on-site.” SEMS made several arguments for why 
neither of those was a “reasonable solution” in this situation.  
 First, SEMS explained the company had previously used excavated material as backfill 
but, since that material was difficult to compact, with time trench subsidence and cracking of 
the trench concrete surface had occurred, and thus additional costs had been incurred to 
remove and replace the concrete. Further, it argued that since the Reimbursement Guidance 
Document – 002, specifically Task 4.4.a.5, CAS Trench Installation, includes in the cost of 
$65.00 per foot for trenching the cost per foot of 10 tons of gravel, then gravel, not soil, should 
be used as fill material, and it noted Task 4.4.a.5 “does not specify that non-contaminated soil 
must be used as fill material.” (Appeal Request, p. 2) Second, it argued that because the site is 
an active car lot, the Division’s second suggestion would not work simply because “There is no 
place on-site to spread construction debris.” (Request, p. 2) Third, it argued the disposal of 
non-contaminated soil cuttings from the installation of the CAS recover well should be 
reimbursable first because there was no place to spread those cuttings on-site; and second, in 
direct contrast to the Division’s characterization of the soil cuttings as merely soil, SEMS 
contended, “The soil cuttings should also be treated as construction debris, since they are the 
waste product of the installation of groundwater monitoring and recovery wells.” (Request, p. 
2)  
 However, in its letter dated May 23, 2014, the Division merely ignored SEMS’ 
arguments concerning the practicality of spreading the soil on-site; the Company’s reliance on 
the Division’s past actions of reimbursing for the removal of construction debris, and its 
argument that the soil cuttings should be characterized construction debris. Instead, the State 
continued to deny the amount of $4,231.00 solely on its characterization of the soil cuttings 
and trenching as simply “ uncontaminated soil” arguing, “Because since the soil was not 
separate from the asphalt/concrete debris there is no knowledge how much trenching soil was 
included with the debris.” It then concluded “UST does not reimburse for trenching material to 
be removed. UST does not reimburse for the removal and disposal of non-contaminated soil.” 
On June 19, 2014, the owner, Ali Aman, through his attorney, submitted a “Petition for Review 
and Hearing.” 
 In his Petition, Aman, in line with SEMS own appeal, made several arguments for why 
the matter should be heard before the Tennessee Solid Waste and Underground Storage Board. 
He asserted: (1) the “non-contaminated soil” should be considered construction debris because 
it was generated during the installation of a Corrective Action System’s (CAS) groundwater 
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recovery wells (drill cuttings) and conveyance piping from the recovery wells to the CAS 
(excavated trench soil); (2) the site is an active, pre-owned car lot whose surface is covered 
with asphalt/concrete paving; therefore, the “non-contaminated soil” could not be spread 
onsite; and (3) the excavated soil and drill cuttings are not suitable for piping trench backfill 
because, since they cannot be compacted back to “native conditions,” the resulting subsidence 
“could cause cracking of the piping trench concrete cap” and thus “additional costs would be 
incurred to replace the concrete. (Petition, June 19, 2014) Significantly, Aman’s Petition 
revealed some key issues with the Division’s position.  
 First, while the Division did correctly state that its Reimbursement Guidance Document 
– 002 (effective date January 2, 2012) establishes the Division does not pay for the storage and 
removal of “non-contaminated soil,” it must be emphasized it was “non-contaminated soil” as 
defined by the State of Tennessee. 1.4j under Task 1.4 TRBCA Closure Process states, “This 
SOW will include all costs necessary for disposal of petroleum contaminated soil at a 
permitted landfill. Disposal of soil with contamination levels below the Division’s site-specific 
cleanup levels will not be reimbursed.” (Reimbursement Guidelines, p. 34) Significantly, site-
specific clean-up levels are just that – they are specific to each site.  
 In Tennessee, site-specific clean-up levels are based on indoor inhalation from soil or 
contaminated groundwater and vary depending on such factors as the type of property, 
commercial or residential; the depth of the soil; the direction of groundwater flow; the potential 
for contaminates to “migrate” off-site and contaminate other properties or flow into various 
receptors such as city groundwater wells, etc.  
 Second, nothing could be found in the 2012 regulations stating the Division would not 
pay for the removal of trenching debris, in fact, the term “trenching debris” could not be 
located anywhere in those regulations. An additional issue arose concerning the Division’s 
directive that non-contaminated soil should be spread on-site. As noted in SEMS appeal, 
nothing in the regulations required that to be done and, as both SEMS and Aman’s appeals 
revealed, doing so was simply not practical in this situation.    
 Thus, at this point it appeared the State had two distinct possible solutions for how it 
could deal with the soil generated through drilling and trenching. One, it could do, as SEMS 
and Aman proposed, characterize it as construction debris and pay for its removal from the 
site. Two, the State could do, as it chose, characterize the soil as merely “non-contaminated 
soil” and direct it be used as backfill or merely spread on-site. Hence, in his First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production for Robert J. Martineau,” (Robert J. Martineau 
being the Commissioner of TDEQ), Aman raised several issues.  
 Key to Aman’s position was the fact that Tennessee, after the remediation system was 
installed on his property, changed the guidelines by adding another task, Task 4.4.a13, and that 
change seemed to highlight further issues with the State’s position. The Task states, “This 
SOW (Scope of Work) will include the cost for the proper disposal of noncontaminated 
materials that must be removed from the site during installation of the CAS and associated 
trenching. This includes asphalt, concrete/rebar, scrap trench piping but does not include 
disposal of soils or gravel.” (RGD-002 Revised 04-15-14, p. 64) Considering the State had 
denied Aman’s request to pay for the removal of the soil generated by drilling and trenching 
based on the argument that they were not construction debris but non-contaminated soil, but 
now the State felt the need to define explicitly what was and was not construction debris, i.e. 
non-contaminated material the State will pay to have removed, in his First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, Aman asked several questions. 
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 First, in Question 2 he asked that the State “Please identify the section and page number 
of the previous Reimbursement Guidance Document that specified excavated CAS trench soil 
or gravel was not considered site debris.” (Aman’s Interrogatories, p. 4) Second, as the new 
task demonstrated, since prior regulations had been silent on the issue of what precisely 
constituted site debris, in Question 3 he asked that the State “Please provide the rationale for 
excluding trench soil or gravel as site debris under the prior RGD when the Division now 
defines site debris as ‘non-contaminated materials that must be removed from the site during 
installation of the CAS and associated trenching.’” (Aman’s Interrogatories, p. 4-5)  
 Aman’s question 4 emerged from a possible conflict between the State’s guidelines and 
its decision not to pay for the removal of the trench soil and drill cuttings. In its 2012 Guidance 
Document, in Section V. Eligible Costs, under Section D, Risk Management and Corrective 
Action, the State clearly lists as covered costs associated with the “installation of recovery 
wells, trenches, and associated piping.” (Guidance Document, p. 11) Hence, in question 4 he 
first noted that the “trench soil/construction debris” at the facility “was generated during the 
installation of a CAS in accordance with an approved Division Corrective Action Plan.” Then, 
considering the Reimbursement Package for the site was submitted prior to April 15, 2015, he 
asked that the State, “please provide the rationale for excluding trench soil or gravel as site 
debris when the Division currently defines site debris as ‘non-contaminated materials that must 
be removed from the site during installation of the CAS and associated trenching.’” (Aman’s 
Interrogatories, p. 5). 
 The State’s answer to Interrogatory 2 clearly highlights the fundamental disagreement 
between its perspective on soil/gravel and Aman’s as well as the fluid nature of what defines 
“contaminated” verses “non-contaminated” soil. Rather than directly explaining why trench 
soil/drill cuttings and gravel should not be considered “construction debris,” under the 2012 
guidelines, the State simply ignored Aman’s argument that it should. Instead, it merely 
referenced those tasks in the old Reimbursement Guidance Document that dealt with soil – not 
construction debris. Noting the 2012 guidelines cover this site, in its answer the State contends, 
“The old reimbursement guidance document which governs this appeal explicitly states 
disposal of soil with contaminant concentrations below state specific clean up levels will not be 
reimbursed.” (Respondent’s Answers, p. 5) However, it should never be forgotten that the State 
itself determines when soil is or is not “contaminated” and that determination varies from site 
to site. Note, rather than “state specific clean up levels, the guidelines actually state “Site 
Specific Clean-up Levels” (Guidance Document, p. 34) Furthermore, the State’s response still 
begs the question of whether or not “trench soil/drill cuttings” should be characterized merely 
as soil, or, as Question 4 clearly suggests, since they were generated during the construction of 
a CAS, as construction debris. Questions 3 and 4 are attempts to force the State to provide the 
grounds for its decision not to characterize trench soil/drill cuttings and gravel as construction 
debris and pay for its removal. 
 In its response to Question 3, after objecting that the form of the question was unclear, 
the State then argued, “The Department also objects to the interrogatory to the extent it calls 
for information protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege ….” 
(Respondent’s Answers, p. 5) Its response to Question 4 is identical. Once again, after first 
objecting that the form of the question is unclear, the State then contended, “The Department 
also objects to the interrogatory to the extent it calls for information protected from disclosure 
by the deliberative process privilege and to the extent it calls for a legal argument and 
conclusion.” (Respondent’s Answers, p. 6) All-important, in its answer to these two 
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interrogatories the State relied upon the extremely controversial “deliberative privilege” 
doctrine. Furthermore, in direct contrast to contemporary calls for greater stakeholder 
participation, its use here provides a very clear example of how that privilege can be utilized to 
cut the public out of the process of public decision-making. To examine this issue further, this 
paper will first discuss the motivation behind and goal of privileges in general and then the 
motivations behind and goals of the deliberative privilege in particular. To highlight the 
dangers that privilege presents, it will discuss the concepts presented in terms of the particular 
example of the State’s responses to Aman’s questions. Finally, it will suggest a way out of the 
“black hole” of deliberative privilege. 
3. PRIVILEGES 
Because of their inherent internal dynamics, privileges in general are extremely controversial. 
That is, privileges exist to allow one party in a dispute to refuse to produce/reveal to another 
party material that may be essential for the attainment of justice. As Charles T. McCormick 
explained in 1938, many privileges “… do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but 
rather they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships 
which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some 
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.” (McCormick, p. 
447-8) Hence, as McCormick further explains, inherent in the notion of privileges is a 
“straining toward conflicting ends, the end of truth and the end of furthering the outside 
interest.” (p. 464) Objections to the deliberative privilege specifically emerge from issues with 
privileges in general.  
 In 1990 Gerald Wetlaufer discussed and defined the deliberative privilege, explaining, 
“The general deliberative privilege is relatively new to the list of evidentiary privileges that the 
federal executive may assert in the course of judicial proceedings. It is a qualified privilege 
under which the executive is now routinely excused from the obligation to disclose, in civil 
litigation, the advice, opinions and recommendations that are communicated during a 
deliberation that leads to the making of any decision in the executive branch.” (Wetlaufer, p. 
847) Continuing, he notes, “The underlying rationale is that disclosure of deliberative 
communications will chill future communications, thus diminishing the effectiveness of 
executive decisionmaking and injuring the public issue.” Hence, directly in line with privileges 
in general, the deliberative privilege is a balance between attaining justice for an individual 
plaintiff and a broader outside interest in effective executive policy making. 
 However, it is the secretive nature of the privilege that is perhaps its most disturbing 
aspect. As Wetlaufer explains, “The general deliberative privilege is a privilege that is best 
defined in terms of its rationale. That rationale is the instrumental claim that secrecy is 
necessary to candor, that candor is necessary to effective decisionmaking by the executive, and 
that enhancing the effectiveness of executive decisionmaking serves the public interest.” (p. 
849) Unfortunately, as Wetlaufer reveals, effective executive decision-making may not be the 
actual result of reliance on the privilege.  
 In addition to the secrecy it permits, Wetlaufer also criticizes the deliberative privilege 
because of the damage its use causes to the credibility of the executive. He argues that rather 
than aiding executive decision-making, the privilege actually diminishes the effectiveness of 
the executive because, by harming the executive’s credibility, it diminishes the ability of the 
executive to “implement” executive decisions. “When a government keeps secret the processes 
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by which its most ordinary decisions are reached or defends itself in court through a poorly 
justified form of executive privilege, it uses up some of the respect, the legitimacy and the 
credibility on which rests its ability to govern.” (p. 890) Wetlaufer provides still another 
argument against a general deliberative privilege. 
 Expanding upon the need for balance inherent in any privilege, Wetlaufter contends, 
“… the decision whether to grant this privilege affects interests other than the executive’s …. 
the decision to grant this privilege will have significant adverse effects on the judiciary, on 
individual litigants including those who have perfectly just claims against the government, and 
on the principle of citizen sovereignty.” (Wetlaufer, p. 890-1) Concerning the judiciary, he 
notes the privilege “operates to defeat the ends of justice” and threatens “the very integrity of 
the judicial system and public confidence in that system.” (p. 891) Concerning individual 
litigants, he contends the privilege “has its most direct effect on individual litigants who are 
denied access to documents and testimony that bear closely enough upon their case that, absent 
the privilege, discovery would have been permitted” and concludes, “The effects that the 
privilege is likely to have on individual litigants include: a diminished likelihood that the 
individual will win a case that, absent the privilege, would have been decided in her favour; a 
diminished likelihood that she will secure a settlement consistent with the true strength of her 
claim; an increase in the cost of the litigation; and, in the event that she loses, a diminished 
sense that she has been treated fairly by the system.” (p. 892) 
 In terms of its effects on citizens, particularly, citizen sovereignty, he presents two key 
arguments for why the deliberative privilege hurts that. First, he notes, “Executive secrecy also 
has a number of effects, almost all bad, on the power and effectiveness of the citizens who we 
regard as sovereigns and on the possibilities that we might realize the ideals of democracy and 
self-government. First, executive secrecy operates to disempower citizens by depriving them of 
the information that they may need in order effectively to promote their interests.” (Wetlaufer, 
p. 892) He postulates specifically, the privilege may “diminish the level of information 
available to citizens” concerning precisely how the government is operating and the degree to 
which it is attending to their needs. (p. 893) 
 Second, Wetlaufer argues, “Additionally, the establishment of the general deliberative 
privilege will operate to diminish the sense of accountability under which executive officials 
do their business” and contends that diminished sense of accountability “may increase the 
likelihood that the official will act in a way that is sloppy or incompetent, that he will confuse 
his own self-interest (or that of a particular constituency) with the interests of the public, or 
that he will engage in various kinds of bad acts with which he would not want to be publicly 
associated.” (p. 893) So, in light of its possible negative effects, the question becomes why 
does the deliberative privilege even exist, for not only does it exist, but it is being utilized more 
and more. The answer, somewhat incongruously, is found within the Freedom of Information 
Act itself. 
4. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
Historically, under Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), a 
government agency was allowed to withhold information “in the public interest” for “good 
cause shown.” Unfortunately, agencies often relied upon the section to conceal government 
misconduct. In 1966, believing that the increased availability of governmental information to 
the general public would serve democratic values, Congress enacted the Freedom of 
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Information Act or FOIA. FOIA was intended to make governmental disclosure the norm, 
rather than the exception. However, in spite of its lofty goals, the statute lists nine exemptions 
upon which a federal agency may rely to withhold information in certain circumstances. The 
exemption relied upon the most is Number 5 which “protects against disclosure of internal 
agency communications that would expose an agency’s deliberative process or that are 
otherwise privileged.” Thus, opinions and recommendations that reflect an agency’s pre-
decisional deliberations are shielded from disclosure by Exemption 5. Significantly, Exemption 
5 has been highly criticized, particularly as it relates to administrative decision-making. 
 Kristi A. Miles notes the FOIA was enacted “with the express intention of forcing 
disclosure of government information that was being withheld from the public under Section 3 
of the APA.” (Miles, p. 1327) Then, focusing directly on administrative decision-making, she 
argues the FOIA should be a means for the public to hold “federal administrative agencies 
accountable for their actions,” and warns, “These agencies are not (directly) subject to the 
political process that operates as a check on the legislature. If ‘[w]e the people’ are to retain 
any meaningful power over the burgeoning administrative bureaucracy, we must be an 
informed citizenry.” (p. 1340) It should be noted that, like all other privileges, Exemption 5 
also entails a balancing of conflicting interests. 
 On the one hand, the privilege is justified by the “chilling effect.” Those who favour it 
argue that if administrators know their deliberations will be open to discovery, they may not 
feel free to debate openly about various administrative issues. However, numerous 
commentators have questioned the validity of that justification, noting that no empirical 
evidence has ever been presented to justify it. For her part, Miles notes that even if Exemption 
5 “may indeed encourage candid debate within the halls of the federal bureaucracy. We are 
likely to find, however, that allowing the rulemaking process to operate as a ‘black box’ with 
uncertain contents will have consequences far worse than whatever adverse effects might result 
from too much disclosure.” (p. 1341) Thus, Miles clearly points out that the deliberative 
privilege doctrine has the potential to shut the public out from a large part of the process of 
public policy decision-making – all that occurs in the context of the “burgeoning 
administrative bureaucracy.” The State’s response to Aman’s interrogatories serves as an 
example of how the administration may try to block the public from participating in 
administrative decision-making. 
 In his third and fourth interrogatories, Aman asked the State to identify the 
rationale/criteria that formed the basis for its decision not to include soil generated from well 
drilling and trenching in its definition of construction debris, a decision that allowed the State 
to classify that material merely as non-contaminated soil and, further, to direct contractors to 
separate that soil out from the construction debris and use it as backfill or simply spread it on-
site. In terms of its first alternative, using that soil as backfill, in its letter dated May 19, 2014, 
SEMS, an environmental contractor with wide experience in the field, had clearly explained 
why that was not a satisfactory solution. Yet, rather than responding directly to SEMS 
arguments, the information SEMS provided seemed to go straight into the “black hole” of 
administrative decision-making as the State merely ignored the company’s arguments and, 
relying upon the deliberative process privilege instead, merely argued it was not obligated to 
provide that information because it was part of the deliberative process. However, because of 
its potential to create a true health and environmental hazard, the true danger of its use of that 
privilege emerges from its second alternative, just spreading the soil on the ground. 
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 Benzene is a carcinogen. That fact was one of the key motivators behind the initial 
passage of the LUST law. Furthermore, and all-important, it can be absorbed through the skin. 
As a result of this situation, a difference exists between Tennessee’s “site specific” criteria for 
determining non-contaminated soil and one for when that same soil has the potential for dermal 
contact. Significantly, the depth of soil considered for UST work in Tennessee is 3-30 feet. 
Anything above 3 feet is considered “surface soil,” and UST work does not cover 
contamination of “surface soil,” just contamination from underground storage tanks; soil below 
30 feet is considered too deep to affect indoor inhalation levels. Consequently, whether or not 
soil at those levels is contaminated is irrelevant to the establishment of site-specific clean-up 
levels. It should be noted that this is not the case in all states. The more universally accepted 
EPA requirements have an objective contamination level for when soil containing benzene has 
the potential for coming into dermal contact, and, in contrast to Tennessee, some states 
consider that potential when determining site-specific clean-up levels. For example in 
Missouri, when establishing those levels, the State considers the potential for children to play 
in the water, eat the dirt excavated from the site, etc. Consequently, due to surface spills as 
well as the possibility for leaking drainage pipes, soil from trenching, according to some 
standards, although not according to the State of Tennessee, might well be contaminated, and 
thus, spreading it on the site could, as the State of Missouri fully recognizes, create a potential 
environmental and health hazard. The difference between these standards motivated Aman’s 
second and third interrogatories. 
 The possibility existed that, in order to save the State the cost of hauling off the soil 
generated through drilling and trenching, the State utilized the site-specific standard, rather 
than the EPA dermal contact standard, to define that soil as non-contaminated and thus “safe” 
to use as backfill or simply spread on-site and allowed to try. Obviously applying the site-
specific standard to establish the safety of the soil once the possibility existed for it to make 
dermal contact would put the State in the position of using a federal law intended to alleviate 
an environmental/health hazard to create a new and potentially more dangerous 
environmental/health hazard. However, rather than providing the criteria upon which it based 
its decision, the State once again merely retreated to the “black hole” of the deliberative 
privilege doctrine. Significantly, at this point, it should be pointed out a very real possibility 
exists for shining at least a ray of light into that black hole: classifying criteria as facts. 
5. CRITERIA AS FACTS 
Not surprisingly, considering its location in Washington, D.C., the headquarters of many 
federal government agencies, the D.C. Circuit Court has reached more decisions concerning 
Exemption 5 than has any other court, and its holdings establish a very significant distinction. 
The Court has held that purely factual material, or factual portions of otherwise deliberative 
documents, is not protected from disclosure. That is, it created an “opinion/fact distinction. 
While it does acknowledge facts might not be released if they would reveal the “underlying 
substantive nature of those deliberations,” still, the D.C. Circuit Court explicitly argued 
Exemption 5 only protects factual material if such material was “selectively collected in the 
course of the decisionmaking process.” The Court clearly pointed out that, “To allow agencies 
to simply label particular documents ‘deliberative’ and therefore exempt from disclosure 
‘would result in a huge mass of material forever screened from public view.” (Miles, p. 1331) 
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The State’s response to Aman’s interrogatories illustrates why making criteria discoverable 
could be so helpful.  
 Tennessee seems to contradict itself with its two possibilities for how to deal with non-
contaminated soil. In light of SEMS arguments concerning the additional costs that would be 
involved, its directive to use that material as backfill seems to ignore any monetary concerns. 
However, its directive to spread that material on site seems to place monetary concerns above 
all others – even the very real possibility of creating an additional health and environmental 
hazard. Furthermore, Aman’s fourth interrogatory seems to bring out another contradiction. In 
light of the State’s assertion in its guidelines that it would pay for the costs associated with the 
installation of a CAS remediation system, including the installation of recovery well, trenches, 
and associated piping and considering the soil in question was generated during the installation 
of such, why would the State refuse to define the soil SEMS generated when drilling wells and 
trenching for piping as construction debris and pay for its removal? 
Due to these conflicts in its position, it is not surprising the State was reticent to reveal the 
criteria upon which it based its decision and retreated to a deliberative privilege argument 
instead. That is, in line with Wetlaufer’s contentions, rather than making administrative 
decision-making better by avoiding the “chilling effect,” even if it had a legitimate basis for its 
decision, the State’s reliance upon the deliberative privilege gave the appearance it was merely 
trying to hide sloppy decision-making. However, characterizing criteria as facts would be one 
way to ensure a more valid administrative decision-making process. 
 First, in line with the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion, criteria can legitimately be defined 
as facts. That is, while the process of arriving at site-specific clean-up levels and applying 
those to evaluate the acceptability of the suggested possible solutions can be characterized as 
forms of deliberation and thus, non-discoverable, the actual criteria themselves are objective 
facts/values, and thus, discoverable. For example, in this particular legal proceeding, the 
Plaintiff was not asking for any information about the deliberations involved in either 
establishing or applying those criteria, instead, in light of the very real difference between the 
safety level of benzene in soil depending on whether that level is site-specific or the EPA’s 
more objective one that applies when the possibility for dermal contact exists and the State’s 
own assertion it will pay for the costs of installing a remediation system, knowing what criteria 
the State employed when establishing its public policy of simply spreading the soil generated 
from the drilling and trenching that occurs during the installation of a remediation system on-
site to dry or using it as backfill rather than the State paying for its disposal would provide key 
insights into the legitimacy of that policy. 
6. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Additionally, Aman’s example reveals how the concept of deliberative privilege could 
effectively keep the public out of the process of administrative decision-making. In the context 
of this particular legal proceeding, it appears the concept of “deliberative privilege” was used 
not so much to ensure complete and full administrative consideration of the issue as it was to 
force Aman, and thus ultimately the public at large as well, to accept, no questions asked, what 
could potentially be a very unsatisfactory public policy. That is, rather than being utilized to 
avoid the “chilling effect” and thus ensure the broadest, most honest analysis of the situation in 
this example, it seems the concept of deliberative privilege was employed to keep the public 
out of the process of establishing a public policy that had the potential to create significant 
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environmental and health hazard for that public. Thus Aman’s example highlights what is only 
becoming a bigger and bigger issue for, with the expansion of government/administrative 
influence/action/regulation, the use of the deliberative privilege doctrine could effectively 
block the public out of meaningful participation in a very large, very significant area of public 
policy making.  
 However, characterizing criteria as “facts” provides the public a window on that 
process. Knowing that criteria are discoverable would force administrative decision-makers to 
be very open about their criteria rather than relying on possibly unique, personal, and thus 
secretive hidden agendas. That is, rather than hurting the State’s credibility by allowing the 
administrative decision-making process to operate in a “black hole,” a very essential aspect of 
that process, the factual criteria employed to determine the best possible solution, would be 
open to the public. Further, while on the one hand, while knowing those criteria might reveal 
key faults and contradictions within the State’s decision-making process and thus with the 
policies that result from that process, on the other hand, knowing those criteria could also 
reinforce the legitimacy of the administrator’s decision-making process and, as a result, shore 
up public confidence in the validity and, hence, legitimacy of those policies as well.  
7. CONCLUSION  
The deliberative privilege doctrine constitutes a true threat to public participation in the 
process of public policy decision-making, and thus, poses a threat to America’s democratic 
form of government itself. However, all is not lost – characterizing criteria as fact and thus 
discoverable shines a light into the black hole the doctrine creates. That is, forcing 
administrators to be open about the rationale they utilize can reveal a great deal concerning the 
deliberating process itself. Most important, it can ensure that, rather than relying on secretive, 
individual agendas, administrators are keeping the public’s interests first and foremost in their 
decision-making process. Furthermore, just knowing such is the case will give the public 
confidence in those administrators and, as a result, make the public more willing to carry out 
the policies they establish, a situation that, ultimately, can only improve society in general as 
well. 
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